REVIEW ARTICLE

Anthropology: The Empire on which the Sun Never Sets

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Abstract
Questions and debates about the end of anthropology are highlighted here for their potential value in revealing what the ‘crisis talk’ in the discipline really means, and what it may be masking. In this article the reader is invited to reflect on several questions: about anthropology as a discipline or as a praxis; about how anthropology can be not just revitalised, but revolutionised; about the place of ethnography in anthropology; and, the quest for distinction and the accumulation of disciplinary capital. More broadly, this article deals with the restructuring of anthropology within a context of continued imperialism.

Keywords
Disciplines; Domination; Knowledge; Ethnography; Imperialism


‘Anthropology, reified as the study of man, is the study of men in crisis by men in crisis. Anthropologists and their objects, the studied, despite opposing positions in the “scientific” equation, have this much in common: they are both, if not equally, objects of contemporary, imperial civilization. The anthropologist who treats the indigene as an object may define himself as relatively free and integrated, a person, but that is an illusion. In order to objectify the other, one is, at the same time, compelled to objectify the self.’ (Diamond 1969, 401)

‘The problem is already behind us,’ writes Maurice Godelier in his chapter in The End of Anthropology? (203). I was most sympathetic to this particular opening line in reviewing this
collection, almost certainly because it spoke to the trajectory of my own experience. Let me
explain, because this reveals much of how and why I frame certain problematic and controversial
questions arising from the debates embedded in this volume. So here I am, professionally
designated as an anthropologist. Yet, as a professor, I have never worked in an anthropology
department as such—two successive universities in Canada hired me at the tenure-track level,
and in both cases I was/am in a mixed sociology and anthropology department, where the
enrolments in anthropology courses continue to decline, our MA program toys with extinction,
and most of my courses are cross-listed with sociology. Moreover, I earned my Ph.D. from a
department of anthropology that no longer exists as such, and that once before had even been
dissolved. Add to that the fact that I entered anthropology only mid-way through my post-
graduate career, and thus spent half of my life as a university student in a wide range of
departments and interdisciplinary programs, across the social sciences and humanities—
anthropology could not and did not erase any of that, it just added to it. I know almost nothing
about kinship, and never had a course on the subject, nor have I ever produced any genealogical
charts. Margaret Mead is not any ‘ancestor’ of mine, nor are most of the ‘classic’ figures in the
Euro-American discipline. My ‘fieldwork’ (I do not have a friendly view of the term and its
implicit disrespect for other people’s social orders categorized as ‘fields’) always involved a mix
of participation, observation, conversation, debate, interviews, archival research, Internet
research and media analysis: ‘good social science’ is how one former advisor called it,
presumably as a backhanded compliment. Most of my reading extends beyond the discipline of
anthropology, for a very simple reason best summed up once by Edmund Carpenter (1989, 12):
‘the difference between “important ideas” and ideas important in anthropology is often
considerable’. The end of anthropology? Do I sound worried?

What most other academics refer to as ‘anthropology’—and for the purposes of this article I need
to capitalize it as Anthropology from this point onwards—is something that I now tend to see
more in the rear-view mirror, and it keeps getting smaller. However, we need to be clear that the
end of Anthropology as we have known it is, neither for the contributors to the volume nor for
myself, the end of Anthropology as we develop it, and it certainly cannot end anthropology as
such—which I need to keep in the lower case for other purposes in this article as I explain below.

What we are speaking about then is the actual or potential end of Anthropology in two ways: a)
the end of Anthropology as a professionalized and institutionalized discipline created in the late
nineteenth-century European university system (Gulbenkian Commission 1996, 21–22), where
Anthropology arose not as a mere ‘handmaiden’ of imperialism but as one of its very children,
and it served the knowledge-gathering, planning, and ideological purposes of the imperial
fatherland; and/or, b) a particular historical baggage of conventional assumptions, traditional
methods, and received theories and concepts that for various reasons are no longer being upheld,
are contested, and giving way to new approaches which also call themselves Anthropology,
especially as they emerge from within the discipline itself. Then there is what in Anthropology is
much neglected: the existence of anthropology. By the latter anthropology I mean the many
informal, mundane and everyday anthropologies produced consciously or reproduced
unconsciously by diverse communities and persons everywhere, as well as the anthropological
narratives produced by (inter)state institutions and nongovernmental organisations—anywhere
people have an interest in understanding and explaining themselves, others, and their place in the
wider world. These anthropologies are rarely formally marked as ‘anthropology’, but not even
that is entirely accurate any longer. Even in my limited experience I have interacted with what academics might call ‘cultural activists’ and ‘ethnic community organisers’ who call themselves ‘cultural anthropologists’ even without any university education in that discipline, or any university education at all. I have also encountered musicians and theologians that use the word ‘anthropology’ to refer to some ideal state of humanity, or as a philosophy of the human condition. Even when in Anthropology we read or hear about ‘anthropologies’ this is not what is meant however: what is being referred to are other Anthropology departments and traditions outside of the dominant core of the global capitalist system, specifically outside of the western European and Anglo-American world. Given all of these manifestations of anthropology, its proliferation and pluralisation, it is virtually impossible for that reason alone to brashly declare: anthropology is at an end. Whose anthropology? Where? Of what kind? For what purpose? Maurice Bloch’s response, not addressed in this volume, is worthy of note:

'[there are] the general questions of anthropology, which exist irrespective of anthropology departments. In fact, I would consider that all human beings are anthropologists….It’s very possible that anthropology departments will disappear, there’s no reason why they should continue existing.’ (Bloch and Kaaristo 2007, n.p.)

Permanent Anthropology and Impermanent Indigeneity

In his introduction to the volume, Karl-Heinz Kohl opens with some striking questions of decline and continuity. As he observes, ‘talk of the decline of the classical object of anthropological studies is nothing new….leading representatives of the discipline…were haunted by the notion that the last “primitive peoples” were dying out right in front of their eyes. This nightmare is in fact older than academic anthropology itself’ (2). The problem here, as Kohl comments, is that ‘anthropologists often tend to identify with the supposed fate of the object of their research’ (3), hence the pessimism of some, dating back decades. The opportunity lost here for Kohl as for most others, and it is a crucial one I think, is not being able to see that Anthropology was built on the assumption of being the study of peoples always in the process of dying out. This is extinctionism, a correlate of evolutionism and imperial triumphalism that masked itself as ‘science’ (even as it drew on the Bible for support). Anthropology was not intended as the study of difference alone, but more precisely the study of the decline of difference as the world evolved towards Europe. From evolutionary theories to Franz Boas’ ‘salvage’ ethnography, to the reincarnation of evolutionism in modernization theories, and the more recent cases of ‘urgent’ anthropology, as well as the ‘invented traditions’ approaches, all of these betray the same built-in ‘pessimism’.

Even in the critical treatment by Kohl, the issue of the alleged impermanence of Indigenous others reveals an unsettled and thus sometimes contradictory narrative. On the one hand, when reflecting on his visits throughout many years to the villagers of Wamena in New Guinea, Kohl writes about cultural revitalisation, but in terms that depict it as an illusion:

‘Yet to revitalise something suggests that it must have died previously. While the visible surface may be the same, in being reinstated, the traditional dress has altered its meaning. The nakedness of these alleged primitives has become an attraction for tourists.'
Contemporary Dani have become citations, disguising themselves as what they supposedly once were.’ (2)

(Of course to ‘revitalise’ something does not suggest it is dead—the apposite word would have needed to be ‘revival’.) One question immediately arises then, if anthropologists identified their fate with that of the ‘primitives’: whether the changing nature of Anthropology whose continuity, like that of the ‘primitives’, is one that also relies on a display of superficial appearances, as an act of deception, a disguise. However, Kohl later emphasises that the Dani, like many others, show astonishing resilience and flexibility, able to bring their agency to bear on retaining cultural traditions of value to them (3)—what some of us call ‘resurgence’. They survive, anthropology survives.

Yet, it is at the very same time as Indigenous resurgence becomes manifest worldwide, and is even transnationalised, that many anthropologists find new ways to tear resurgence down by arguing that in matters of ‘tradition’ it was all a matter of ‘invention’—once again, Anthropology was about disappearing natives, not their bodies but their cultures. We should note that this critique of modern ‘inventions’ occurred as anthropologists came to recognise that, in Kohl’s words, ‘natives’ were ‘now speaking for themselves,’ and that ‘we no longer have a monopoly on presenting the “native’s point of view”’ (4). Kohl recognises this, but it also seems to irk him a little as when he says that native critiques of anthropology often came ‘from self-appointed spokespersons of the “natives”’ (5). He refers specifically to Haunani-Kay Trask, who strongly criticised Keesing’s (1989) thesis on the invention of tradition, but who in fact added: ‘Unlike Keesing, I cannot speak for other Natives’ (Trask, 1991, 160). One has to wonder why the significant point to make is about whether or not she is ‘self-appointed’ to speak (whatever that means), rather than the strong substance of her article. Moreover, what Kohl bypasses is the critique not of the past but of the continued complicity and collaboration of anthropologists with American empire, whether direct or indirect, and how scholarly authority can be converted into political capital—here Trask refers also to the work of Jocelyn Linnekin (1983):

‘What Linnekin or Keesing or any other anthropologist writes about Hawaiians has more potential power than what Hawaiians write about themselves. Proof of this rests in the use of Linnekin’s argument by the US Navy that Hawaiian nationalists have invented the sacred meaning of Kaho’olawe Island (which the US Navy has controlled and bombed since the Second World War) because nationalists need a “political and cultural symbol of protest” in the modern period (Linnekin 1983, 246). Here, the connection between anthropology and the colonial enterprise is explicit. When Natives accuse Western scholars of exploiting them, they have in mind the exact kind of situation I am describing. In fact, the Navy’s study was done by an anthropologist who, of course, cited fellow anthropologists, including Linnekin, to argue that the Hawaiian assertion of love and sacredness regarding Kaho’olaw was “fakery” (Keene 1986). Far from overstating their case, Native nationalists acutely comprehend the structure of their oppression, including that perpetuated by anthropologists.’ (Trask 1991, 166)

What Trask is also addressing in her passage is that the issue of the complicity of Anthropology with ‘colonialism’ is not something that we can afford to believe is safely sequestered in the past,
a matter we have supposedly dealt with already and can now comfortably move on. There is more to be said on this as we proceed.

Kohl also provides a critique of ‘native’ perspectives in arguing that ‘native anthropologists do not look at their own society as the classical ethnographers have done, as “professional strangers”’, and that such native anthropologists ‘have yet to develop that alienating perspective, often connected to the painful effect of self-alienation, to which anthropology owes its most important insights’ (6). As oft repeated as it has been, by many, this is still for me a remarkable assertion, not to say suspicious—it really deserved explanation, and at least some substantiation. Neither is provided. Left as is, this is at best an awkward claim of differential humanness: unlike us, others experience no alienation. Others form part of perfectly homogeneous communities, where dissent and critical distance are unknown. This does not resonate even remotely in my own ethnographic experience. What such assumptions help to make clearer is the uncomfortable realisation that the decolonisation of Anthropology is still barely in its initial stages. More to the point, if this is the kind of Anthropology about whose fate we worry, then the real question should not be whether it is ending, rather it ought to be how we can go about ending it, quickly and once and for all. Fortunately, there is a significant element within even Euro-American Anthropology that consistently critiques (neo)colonialism, even if it would be too much to suggest that they, in any way, represent the core of the discipline.

‘Ultimately’, Kohl points out, ‘none of the contributors to this collection would assert that anthropology has come or is coming to an end’, and moreover, ‘there are even some doubts whether it is actually in a state of crisis’ (11). Rather than be quick to accuse the contributors of being in denial on the latter point, the suspension of crisis talk is actually quite fruitful for discussing what such talk represents. Nonetheless, I think it is a valid criticism to point out that, while the individual chapters differ, their unanimity on this ‘ultimate’ point can be disappointing for various reasons, namely the lack of diversity and thus limited room for debate.

**Alien Natives**

Kohl’s commentary on native and foreign anthropologists above takes us to the heart of the chapter by Adam Kuper, ‘The original sin of anthropology’. If Kohl reconsidered what Kuper argues, he might not be as confident in his claim that anthropologists study others as professional strangers, but that we are instead the carriers of our own worries and convictions which we transfer to others. In that sense, converting the ‘strange’ into the ‘familiar’ means that we are simply ‘studying’ what is familiar. One might also discuss the reality of the incomplete knowledge if not persistent ignorance of the professional strangers, undermining their claim to be better at explaining ‘natives’ than the ‘natives’ themselves. More broadly, and more profoundly, we could then address the issue of Eurocentrism, and what is apparently the continued belief of some that they are entitled, as experts, to explain the rest of the world to the rest of the world. These questions, unfortunately, do not get much fair play in this volume.

Kuper offers a sharp historical critique of established Anthropology, with the potential of shaking the discipline to its epistemic core. In his chapter he argues that ‘the original sin of anthropology was to take for granted that there were two diametrically opposed types of human society: the civilised and the primitive’, and to the extent that ‘Anthropology defined itself
initially as the science of primitive society’, then ‘this was a very bad mistake’ (37). As he further explains, ‘the term “primitive society” implies a historical point of reference. It presumably defines a type of society ancestral to more advanced forms, on the analogy of an evolutionary history of natural species’ (37). More than that, ‘primitive society’ is an illusion: ‘primitive societies—indeed, primitive people—are figments of the Western imagination’ (37).

What does this say then about the vitality a discipline, if founded on an illusion as Kuper argues? He does not spell out his answer, which is a pity because it could have offered a lone expression of real dissent in this volume.

However, what Kuper does say should give pause to those who would praise our status as ‘professional strangers’. As Kuper argues, ‘our opposite numbers,’ serve a purpose: ‘ideas of primitive society help us to think about our own societies….They are what we are not’ (37). ‘We’ were never studying ‘them’, so much as we were projecting ourselves. In his chapter Kuper presents a very solid and convincing case regarding the early concerns with incest, close-kin breeding, and marriage between cousins, as representative of worries of a particular English class. ‘Typical of the rising educated upper-middle class in England’, Kuper explains, was the preference for marriages between first cousins (42), as was the concern for the health of offspring produced by such unions. Promoted into discussion by Charles Darwin—whose case Kuper examines in great detail—anthropologists took on those ideas in developing studies based on the broad assumption that ‘primitive’ societies were kin-based. ‘As the experts on primitive society,’ Kuper tells us, ‘Victorian anthropologists were necessarily experts on kinship and marriage, because they took it for granted that the first societies were essentially kinship groups. Henry Maine set out a general law: “The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground for community in political functions”’ (45). This classical approach is also directly challenged and refuted by Maurice Godelier in this volume, who explains with regard to the ‘celebrated truths’ that are ‘dead’ for him personally, that ‘nowhere are kinship relations, and even less the family, the basis of societies’ (213).

Crisis and Praxis

Anthropology as a discipline, and anthropology as curiosity about difference or as a philosophy of the human condition, certainly overlap but they are not the same. Enforcers of the discipline have tended to monopolistically speak in the name of the project as a whole. This appropriation, whether intentional or simply a mistake, confuses analysis of the purposes of institutional Anthropology. In Patricia Spyer’s ‘What ends with the end of anthropology?’ in this volume, we see an example of the above. Spyer asks: ‘Would the end of anthropology correspond to the end of otherness as we know it?’ (61). While Spyer makes the valid point that ‘an open stance towards engaging with other lifeways and being potentially remade in the process assumes an even more urgent value in our current age of globalised flows and modernity at large’ (62), that does not actually explain why institutional, professional Anthropology is required. Instead the position seems to rely on a basic and unquestioned formula: Anthropology is the study of otherness, so while there is otherness we must have Anthropology. Many within Anthropology will find this logical; many without, will not understand why a professional discipline is claiming intellectual proprietary rights over otherness, since humans have always had an interest in understanding other humans, with or without the ‘aid’ of a specific profession that was first
formally instituted in Europe during the imperial scramble for Africa. In mistaking discipline with project, profession with praxis, and ‘training’ with intellectual curiosity, Spyer is not able to convincingly cement her point that it is only with professional Anthropology that the ‘ability or even propensity to engage and think other lifeworlds and lifeways’ (63) can be realised. This engagement will happen regardless of Anthropology especially because it cannot be a mere discipline that can serve as the intermediary of all social relations on the planet and as the arbiter of the meanings that inform such social relations and are produced by them.

This does not mean to say that Spyer is ‘wrong’ for finding features of Anthropology worthy of praise, such as its ‘characteristic privileging of everyday nitty-gritty—in the sense of finding virtue and instruction in it—and the tendency to make visible what is invisible’ (65). My question here has to do with the nature of the argument. This becomes clearer, ironically, when Spyer detours from her argument by going into pages and pages of detail from her previous ‘fieldwork’ experiences, all with the aim of showing the value of serendipity. The purpose was lost on me as a reader. Does serendipity end with the end of Anthropology? Does the loss of Anthropology mean people will not learn from serendipitous encounters anymore?

While in ‘The end of anthropology, again: On the future of an in/discipline,’ John Comaroff seems to begin with similar points, his argument is much more productive overall. At first, almost tongue-in-cheek, he asks: ‘As long as there are human beings living on the planet, we will, in principle at least, have an object of study. And after that, who cares?’ (82). Thankfully, he does not rest his argument on that point, but instead turns to issues of crisis and praxis in Anthropology. While he acknowledges Geertz’s point that we may appear to be ‘autopathological’ and suffer from ‘epistemological hypochondria’ (Geertz 1988, 71), Comaroff does better than Geertz in examining and explaining this, thus not reducing self-criticism to a form of pathology (which could suit the purposes of orthodox reactionaries in the discipline). Comaroff explains that ‘crisis and critique are closely connected’ (82) and that to the degree that ‘ours is a critical practice, then—and it is not always that, by any means—it will always be imbricated in crises. Perhaps intermittent iterations of the end of anthropology do not portend oblivion so much as prevent it’ (82). Here Comaroff meets with agreement by Gustavo Lins Ribeiro, who likens Anthropology to a ‘phoenix’: ‘Anthropology’s many deaths and rebirths indicate the discipline’s ability to transform itself’ (2006, 380).

As for Geertz (and numerous others) overdoing the continuing sense of crisis, alarm and anxiety from what has been called the post-modern turn in Anthropology, it is useful to have another perspective on this matter. Noting that the critique of the politics and poetics of ethnographic representation was dominated by Western Anthropologists, Mwenda Ntarangwi (2010, 1-2) observed that the critiques, rather leading to the dismantling of canonical Anthropologies, resulted in ‘the very reinvigoration and worldwide expansion of these standards through elite centres of [A]nthropological production,’ reinforcing the authority and legitimacy of these Western critics as ‘the default “representers” of the realities of the Other that they study’. Elsewhere he raises the question of whether post-modernism was ‘a decoy by mainstream [A]nthropologists to show that they are concerned about their hegemony but not quite committed to transforming and decolonising it’ (Ntarangwi 2010, 19).
Back to Comaroff: when he posits that ‘the discipline ought to be understood as a praxis’ (93), I welcome that as a move to more fertile grounds. By praxis he means ‘Methodology, upper case’:

‘the principled practice by which theory and the concrete world are both constituted and brought into discursive relationship with one another. And they are epistemic in that they entail an orientation to the nature of knowledge itself, its philosophical underpinnings and its notions of truth, fact, value.’ (93)

‘Our topical horizons ought to be configured by our praxis,’ Comaroff adds, and that configuration rests in a ‘critical estrangement of the lived world’ as well as a ‘deconstruction of its surfaces and the relativising of its horizons’ (94). Likewise, Godelier in this volume asks anthropologists to ‘maintain a state of critical vigilance against the ever-possible intrusion of the judgments that the anthropologist’s own society has already formulated about other societies’, arguing that one must always try ‘to decentre oneself’, that is, ‘to suspend one’s own judgment, to push back to the very horizon of consciousness the presuppositions of one’s own culture and society’ (210). From there Comaroff brings into focus what is or ought to be seen as the ‘perennial question’ of this praxis:

‘What is it that actually gives substance to the dominant discourses and conventional practices of that world, to its subject positions and its semiosis, its received categories and their unruly undersides, to the manner in which it is perceived and experienced, fabricated, and contested?’ (94)

Reinterpreting discipline as praxis is, for me at least, a great starting point for more than just revivifying Anthropology, but for revolutionising it, and bringing it closer to other anthropologies. Rather than dwell too much on what makes the discipline a discipline, Comaroff’s position is that ‘ours really is an indiscipline whose conceptual foundations and techniques of knowledge production have almost infinite potential to open up new horizons’ (99). Indeed, as Comaroff argues, ‘ours has long been an undisciplined discipline, whose heterodoxy has always made its future hard to predict. And ultimately, to its great advantage, irrepressible’ (88). This reminds me of a former classmate who, asked to explain why he chose to enter Anthropology, answered that it was the one discipline where one has the freedom to do whatever one wants—the professor winced ever so slightly for just a brief moment, but I understood and appreciated the answer as expressing what ought to be one of the basics of a Charter of Free Thinking that gives the notion of ‘academic freedom’ real substance. Where Comaroff misses great opportunities, however, is precisely in not dwelling on what makes the discipline a discipline, with the result that the institutionalisation and compartmentalisation of knowledge—a system those of us living today did not invent and should feel no obligation to uphold—is left as ‘normal’ and thus removed from question. That in itself goes against the essence of what Comaroff argues is Anthropology as Methodology, as praxis, and what I see as a marriage between principle, ethics, and critique of whatever is established as the dominant norm and mode that works to restrict access to knowledge and resources, and to suppress dignity and justice.

**Ideas for a Revolutionised Anthropology**
On these questions of hegemony, discipline, praxis, and radical critique, Vincent Crapanzano does more than the other contributors in advancing arguments similar to the ones I am raising, with his chapter in this volume, titled ‘The end—the ends—of anthropology’. Very much unlike Signe Howell’s chapter (‘Whatever happened to the spirit of adventure?’), an admittedly conservative and nostalgic interjection that bemoans the decline of ‘fieldwork’ in ‘distant’ and ‘unknown’ parts of the world and largely stands as an opposite to Crapanzano’s chapter in every way, Crapanzano sets a distinct tone for his chapter with the following statement: ‘I do not want to idealise the discipline nor give it a significance it has never had and probably never will have’ (123). To avoid a future where we end in ‘a deadening academicism’, that, ‘however quickened by nostalgia, sentimentality and an elegiac sense of belatedness, is destined to repeat again and again its “tried and true wisdom”—the uncritical litany of class, gender, race and ethnicity, for example,’ Anthropology must, Crapanzano believes, ‘reckon with its artifice and the ethical, as well as the political and epistemological consequences of that reckoning’ (135). The ethical questions we will need to face, he argues (and I agree), extend well beyond the ethics of doing research (‘fieldwork’), where ethical questions are often reduced to basic procedural operations, outside of any larger context: ‘I think we have to ask why we have so often been content with delimiting our ethical concerns to so tiny a domain’ (132). In terms of the political reckoning he mentioned above, Crapanzano suggests that ‘we have not recognised how radical a critique of social and cultural understanding we can make, had we the will’ (114).

Bringing back to mind Comaroff’s ‘perennial question’ of anthropology above, Crapanzano argues that the alterity of the anthropological stance can serve as a corrective to unquestioned cultural assumptions and provides a foundation for social and cultural critique: ‘It impedes the replication of a society’s self-understanding…by distressing that understanding, often, though not uniquely, by revealing its negative undersong. Anthropology has an important iconoclastic dimension’ (133–134). He thus also questions the end of Anthropology ‘from a radically disquieting position: one that aims at breaking the complacency that comes with the institutionalisation of a discipline which by its very structure—the straddling it demands—ought to resist the deadening effects of that institutionalisation’ (113). Crapanzano comes close here to his fellow, Michel-Rolph Trouillot, who was one of the members of the Gulbenkian Commission on the restructuring of the social sciences whose 1996 report was published under the apt title, Open the social sciences. Unfortunately, that work was referenced by no one in this volume, which represents a loss for the depth of its discussion.

Crapanzano also has critical points to make about the hegemony of Anthropology as currently established. One has to do with the need to pluralise anthropology, to challenge ‘the hegemony of the self-stipulated “centres” of anthropological thought and practice in Europe and America’ (118). He objects not only to ‘American anthropology’s indifference to other anthropologies’ (117), but also that colleagues from outside of these hegemonic centres are often treated with ‘a certain condescension’ (118). Crapanzano rightly accuses the Anthropology of the centre of being parochial, primarily addressing U.S. colleagues, and possessing a sense of academic superiority that ‘certainly reflects the prevailing attitude of superiority held by most Americans and their displays, however bankrupt, of diplomatic, military and economic power’ (118; Borneman 1995, 665, makes some relevant and interesting points about Anthropology as a form of foreign policy). However, this too should remind us that rather than telling ourselves that we accomplished our mission of decolonising anthropology many years ago, which would help us to
diminish if not ignore Crapanzano’s points above (also abundantly made by Ntarangwi [2010]),
the critique remains far from finished. If the object of the critique were to be properly understood
as one about Western hegemony (and not about whether this or that person collaborated with
British authorities), and how newer forms of collaboration between Anthropologists and the U.S.
military have emerged, then we are far from ending this discussion.

With respect to the question of anthropology beyond academia, as I spoke of earlier in this
article, here too Crapanzano has sensed the existence of a form of alternative anthropologies
when he criticises the little attention paid to what he calls ‘informants’ counter-ethnography: the
eye they have on the anthropologist as a representative—a source of knowledge—of the
anthropologist’s society and culture’ (121).

The politics of Anthropology also merit critical attention, and Crapanzano at least takes a few
steps in this direction. He observes how ‘striking’ it is that,

‘a field that claims to be as critically self-reflective as anthropology and as sensitive to
the formative power of institutions has not, to my knowledge, explored in any rigorous
and historically sensitive way the relationship between the structure of the university and
other relevant institutions and the manner in which anthropology frames, theorises, and
conveys its subject matter.’ (123)

Crapanzano takes this further, noting that Anthropologists appear blind to the effect on the
discipline not just of the structure of the university, and other dominant institutions, but also
politics in the broad sense: ‘It is my impression that, after a conservative government has been in
power for several years, American anthropology takes a positivist—a scientistic—turn’, and
whether one agrees or not, ‘it does call attention to the need to investigate the relationship among
anthropological practices, prevailing political currents and mediating institutions like funding
agencies’ (124). Fortunately, some efforts by Anthropologists have emerged that focus on the
political and institutional contexts of knowledge production in the discipline, one example being
the volume by Meneley and Young (2005).

Lastly, Crapanzano also faults Anthropologists for being more concerned with how colleagues
will respond to their research, ‘than to the way that research circulates and is made use of outside
the discipline, the university and the scholarly community at large’ (124). In a period of renewed
interest in ethnographic data by the military and intelligence apparatuses of various NATO
member states, corporations, and missionary churches, this demands more attention than has
been given by a resilient few within the discipline. More than just attention even, what is needed
is confrontation on the question of who is being served by Anthropology’s dominant practice of
‘studying-down’.

In his chapter titled, ‘Transitions: notes on sociocultural anthropology’s present and its
transnational potential’, Andre Gingrich suggests that a revolution of sorts is already underway:
‘The content and direction of sociocultural anthropology’s recent processes of self-
examination…indicate a profound and sustained transition of almost unprecedented historical
significance’ (157). Gingrich does not approve of ‘end’ talk as being analytically useful, but
prefers instead the idea of ‘transition’: ‘sociocultural anthropology is undergoing a long process
of transition into a transnational and global phase of critical research. Transitions are always accompanied by uncertainty and doubt about the exact outcome as well as about what is left behind’ (155). Marking these transitions in Anthropology has been the tendency to show less political naïveté and less of a positivist belief in pure science; being more multicentred as a discipline than ever; the majority of anthropologists being sceptical or cautious about the field’s political instrumentalisation by dominant powers; and, the fact that research is being done at home as much as elsewhere (159). As for what has become a virtually institutionalised and permanent backlash against the ‘writing culture’ debates in 1980s Anthropology, Godelier, like Gingrich, takes a more reasoned view: ‘There is in itself nothing surprising about deconstructing a discipline. It is a necessary and normal moment in the development of all sciences, natural as well as social’ (205). Godelier says that some forms of deconstruction could lead to the dissolution and disappearance of a discipline, but other forms may instead lead to the ‘reconstruction’ of the discipline on ‘new foundations’ which are ‘more rigorous, more critical and therefore analytically more effective than they were before’ (205).

Challenging Euro-American hegemony in Anthropology also unites the chapters by Crapanzano and Gingrich. Gingrich, following De L’Éstoile (2008), criticises ‘hegemonic internationalism’, that is where ‘internationalisation’ implies ‘cooperation on the basis of entities whose priorities nevertheless continue to be defined within national limits’ (160), and where Anglo-American hegemony, though increasingly contested, continues to exercise disproportionate influence. Moreover, Gingrich observes that all of the ‘diverse philosophical fragments in anthropology’s current epistemological activities have one common denominator: they are all derived from a common Euro-American epistemological legacy’, and he argues that ‘it will also be important to move beyond that legacy’ (171), but is not altogether clear on how that will be achieved. Nonetheless, he stresses that ‘breaking up’ and ‘leaving behind’ Anthropology’s current Euro-American epistemological monopoly is ‘perhaps the most important’ task, one of transnational and global dimensions (172).

Yet others in this volume do not share such goals of contestation as those above, or what I have called revolutionary goals. Ulf Hannerz, for example, would prefer if anthropologists would stop referring to the ‘rebellious streak’ in the discipline, tone down talk of ‘anthropology as cultural critique, and certainly not stress that it is a ‘subversive discipline’. I would agree too, if Hannerz had meant that anthropologists might be overselling the purported and highly debatable ‘radicalness’ of their discipline. But that is not the intention in Hannerz’s criticism. Instead he says: ‘I would not have recommended it, in the past or at present, as the best brand to take into negotiations with academic administrators or ministry officials who may nervously maximise order and predictability in their domains’ (185). More will follow on Hannerz’s chapter below, especially his generalized argument for conformity with the expectations and desires of dominant elites and their neoliberal designs. Unfortunately, the chapters do not speak to each other in this volume, so the occasion for a debate was lost within its pages, which is odd since the volume apparently emerged from two seminars where presumably participants would get a chance to address one another.

After the Ethnography of the Dominated and Peripheral?
Questioning the dominance of ethnography in Anthropology is virtually a taboo subject, one of the practices of the discipline that is usually removed from question. Therefore, even in a volume such as this one, which has its conservative and defensive voices, it is interesting to see the dominance of ethnography subject to at least some polite debate. At the very least, this suggests that there is some doubt. However, I wish that I had seen more discussion in this volume similar to what Elizabeth Bird raises in positing that ‘what is ethnographic is not the way of gathering information, rather, ethnography is a “way of seeing”, to get close to those we study in order to better understand what their activities and experiences mean to them’ (2003, 8).

In ‘The crisis of anthropology,’ the chapter by Holger Jebens, we find some of the historical seeds of the fixation with ethnography, especially as defended by hegemonic Anthropology’s most prominent spokespersons. Jebens thus quotes Claude Lévi-Strauss who insisted that an anthropologist “needs experience on the ground….It is a decisive moment in his education” (17). More than that, Jebens argues that ‘fieldwork came to be regarded as a ritual re-enactment of Malinowski’s stay in the Trobriand Islands as a kind of mythic event’ (17). In describing the ‘fervent doxology of fieldwork’ and the creation of a ‘fieldwork mystique’, Jebens presents ‘the ideology of fieldwork’ and its recourse to religious notions to justify itself, with ideas such as fieldwork being the ‘ritual of admission’ to the discipline, a ritual that involves the creation of a ‘new man’ from the field experience, the travail of fieldwork symbolising the ‘blood of the martyrs’ (17). No wonder then that calling fieldwork into question is taken by some as an ‘existential threat’ to the discipline (19). As Jebens presents in his chapter, some have argued that the ‘exaggeration’ of fieldwork helped the ‘anthropological guild’ to establish itself (I would say entrench itself, in addition) as an academic discipline, along with developing hierarchical grading and a system of leadership (p. 18). However even with such potentially revolutionary criticisms being aired in the chapter, Jebens feels the need to resort to what appears to be an orthodox defence of fieldwork, going as far as providing a list of activities that do not qualify as fieldwork, stressing that it is not the same thing as reading newspapers, analysing government documents, observing the activities of governing elites, or even tracking the internal logic of transnational development agencies and corporations (27). To preserve the integrity of fieldwork, Jebens argues in agreement with Bruce Kapferer, is to preserve the basis for criticising ‘on the basis of in-depth knowledge of other forms of existence’ (27). Can there no criticism otherwise? How does a Noam Chomsky find so much to criticise about the dominant ideologies, policies, and practices of his own society, without doing ethnographic ‘fieldwork’ in another society that is far removed from it, indeed without doing ‘fieldwork’ of any kind? Indeed, that is perhaps the reason why Chomsky can and does, and why so many anthropologists have much less to offer in the way of criticism, for all of their knowledge of other forms of existence. Certainly it is at the very least an illogical argument to make, that without ‘fieldwork’ among others we cannot criticise what currently dominates—when in actuality, as the ‘invented traditions’ years in Anthropology demonstrated, some of us may criticise the ‘poor and the powerless’ of the world-system while also making them legible to the authorities.

Even in Comaroff’s chapter in this volume, substantial value is attached to ethnography, without much in the way of question. Comaroff argues—despite claiming that anthropology is irrepressibly an indiscipline that ranges freely—that there is ‘no such thing as a postethnographic anthropology just as there is no such thing as a posttheoretical one’ (102). I would not dispute this way of formulating matters, since in that section of this chapter he is trying to balance theory
and ethnography. My question is: why this exclusive and singular emphasis on ethnography specifically? Is this the only way anthropologists will talk about *qualitative empirical research*, and *personal experience and reflection*? Must these always and only be discussed under the sign of ‘ethnography’, when it is loaded with all sorts of baggage intended by some (such as Howell) to take you only to some places, some questions, and only with some groups of people?

Signe Howell’s chapter is indicative of the kinds of loads carried by ‘ethnography’, the conventions and expectations that are sometimes made to weigh on many of us. She speaks of ethnography in ‘distant’ and ‘unknown’ parts of the world as an ‘adventure’, and she faults graduate students for lacking this ‘spirit of adventure’. I need to be candid, without the commentary being misconstrued as any sort of attack on the messenger, who was not known to me before I read this chapter: ‘adventure’ is the last term I was hoping to encounter in this volume. This is a term so loaded with the imperialism of forced encounters and intervention that one cannot simply cast aside decades of anti-colonial criticism and go back to arguing that white people should go prove themselves in other societies and maybe have some fun while they are at it, while helping to advance their careers, and much more important, the reputation, honour, and distinction of a discipline that can behave as if it were another extraction industry. Yet, while I say that one cannot simply cast aside decades of anti-colonial criticism, apparently this is exactly what is happening in some quarters, which leads me to ask why this is so often ignored.

Indeed, in matters of ethnography and distinction Howell is straightforward about asserting that we ‘must become more proactive in the defense of our methods’ (141), that is, in defending our supposed historical monopoly on ethnography, and to always point out that when others do ethnography it’s not ‘really ethnography’ (141). This raises some interesting historical matters that are often overlooked by anthropologists. Ethnography in both Anthropology and Sociology emerged in the early twentieth-century as two ‘entirely independent intellectual developments’ (Brewer 2000, 11). It is not correct for Anthropologists today to claim something approximating patent rights to ethnography, especially not when many of us have quietly smuggled into our reading the lists the ethnographies of Sociologists such as William Foote Whyte, to name a later example in this history of ethnography in Sociology. Pitirim Sorokin, founder of Sociology at Harvard, did ethnographic work in Russia’s north in 1908 and 1909. Richard Thurnwald did a year of ethnographic fieldwork in New Guinea, before World War I, and before Bronislaw Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands. In Sociology at the University of Chicago, Robert E. Park was already advocating ethnography to his students in the 1920s, coining the phrase about getting the seat of one’s pants dirty (Brewer 2000, 13). Perhaps this has been missed by many since a few Sociologists themselves often tended to call ethnography by other names, such as field research or participant observation. Nonetheless, Deegan (2001,11), dates ethnography in Sociology at the University of Chicago to 1917, to the work of Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. Though there are different chronologies, clearly ethnography in Sociology well predates the late 1930s, which is incorrectly ascribed by some as its beginning, perhaps in order to privilege the role of W. Lloyd Warner, an Anthropologist working in Sociology at Chicago. Yet, the Sociologists Nels Anderson (1923) and Edmund William Bradwin (1928) conducted ethnographic research in urban areas of North America well before then.

It may be that Howell does not count urban ethnography at home as being either real ethnography or real Anthropology. That Howell is predisposed to favouring the far away is not a
matter of conjecture: ‘Anyone who has travelled in Central or Southeast Asia or Melanesia knows that there is no shortage of fascinating localities in which to settle to conduct in-depth anthropological fieldwork’ (149). The choice of term ‘to settle’ is fortuitous here, because it speaks to a settlers’ Anthropology. The ‘fascinating’ localities are not to be found at home, but are only those few remaining places in the world where really real ‘anthropology’ can ‘still’ be done. This position seems to add considerable weight to Ntarangwi’s conclusion that Anthropology remains stuck in its study of alterity.

Interesting given the other more conformist aspects of his chapter, Ulf Hannerz is perhaps the only contributor to the volume to establish some critical distance on this question. Anthropology, he warns (like Bird 2003), ‘cannot be reduced to a method—some sort of qualitative counterpart to statistics’ (186). Nonetheless, none of these specific contributors envisions anything like ‘anthropological commentary’, distinguished by what it says about the global problematic of the human condition, speaking to broad issues of domination and differentiation such as war, forced income inequalities, ‘humanitarian’ interventions, ‘human rights’, ‘development’, and so forth. After all, if generations of accumulated ethnographies do not afford us to speak without doing more ethnography before we speak out on current matters of grave public concern, then what is the value of that accumulated knowledge? Is it ‘dead’ per chance?

**Distinction and Disciplinary Capital**

It then seems that it is the ultimate question of distinction to which this volume boils down in addressing the ‘threats’ to the discipline. It is not difficult to sense the presence of a certain ‘despondency theory’ at work, where change is sometimes equated with loss, and ‘mixture’ with death of the original (see Sahlins 1999). While the contributions do vary, and offer different points for consideration, the basic thrust of the volume focuses on the academic politics of knowledge production: preserving the discipline as a discipline, developing core standards, and even branding.

First there is the argument that Anthropology must differ from all other endeavours if it is to maintain its distinction. The question then is not whether other approaches are valid, interesting, useful and offer potential for collaboration with Anthropologists, rather it is about keeping them at a distance to maintain what is entirely an artificial boundary, a figment of the nineteenth-century Eurocentric imagination. Why, I would also like to ask, should we keep the work of journalists at bay? Is it because some bureau chiefs lived continuously for years if not decades in the societies they wrote about, and we cannot hope to match that sort of long-term exposure and immersion? What about others, for example, dissidents who once worked in the CIA or State Department, and whose personal insights we cannot ourselves gain without doing covert research of the riskiest kind? Do we shun dialogue for the sake of boundary-maintenance? Does everyone agree with that as a job description for Anthropology?

Comaroff for his part does take note of the fear of dissipation and annihilation, repeating others who believe that a discipline that ‘takes to doing work that could as well be done, and be done as well, by journalists, technicians of ephemera, is indeed one without a distinctive subject, distinctive theoretical concepts, distinctive methods, or a distinctive place in the disciplinary division of labour’, and is thus a discipline that is ‘waiting to be erased’ (86). Howell echoes this
fear: ‘what insights can anthropologists produce that a clever journalist cannot, or someone from cultural studies armed with exciting theoretical concepts?’ (152). To me, this question does not commend itself as an interesting or important one, except to note that it means we have largely sidelined certain issues which have now become the core of competing fields, such as post-colonialism, or race in cultural studies. I am not sure this disciplining has worked to the advantage of Anthropology.

Comaroff himself does not readily endorse this fear of dissipation either. His argument is that the perceived loss of distinctive subject matter, methods, concepts, and theories, and thus the loss of a ‘unique place’ in the ‘disciplinary division of labour’, is a concern that is ultimately based on ‘a fallacy of misplaced typification,’ which posits, ‘that anthropology is a species of knowledge defined by its topical reach and received techniques. In sum, we are what we study and how we study it’ (93). Yet even Comaroff does not escape this framework entirely either. When he notes that ‘other disciplines may equally be said to be in crisis’ (87) he does not take this opportunity to radically rethink Anthropology as a harbinger or leader in opening itself to different forms of knowledge, which is precisely what it claims to do outside of academic walls. Instead, Comaroff reassures conservative readers: ‘we are not dissolving into the other social sciences’—as if this were a bad thing—‘the difference between us and them could not be more marked’ (100). Anthropology can still claim a unique place for itself in the world’, Comaroff adds (101).

The second argument made by three of the contributors, concerns ‘branding’. Howell, for example, says ‘there are clear signs that the trademarks of anthropology that underscored all ethnographic fieldwork are by many no longer perceived as essential’ (139, emphasis added), and among these changes are shorter times in the field, not learning other languages, the use of questionnaires, the lack of holism, studies in one’s own country, and becoming more multidisciplinary. While Gingrich does not address the ‘trademark’ issue explicitly,1 he does argue that ‘a small field like ours needs to reach some minimum consensus about transnational quality standards’ (164). This then inevitably translates into a project for regaining hegemony, countering a plural ethic, and turning us into real disciplinarians, something akin to border patrol guards. Hannerz, in his chapter titled, ‘Diversity is our business’, makes the most concerted effort in this volume in terms of arguing for a ‘brand’.

‘Anthropology needs to cultivate a strong brand’, Hannerz argues (184). He explains why:

‘in times of not just neoliberal thought but also of media saturation and short attention spans, it may be that “brand” is a useful root metaphor, a word to think with in the world we live in. Brands should attract outsiders: customers, visitors, members of the public….they should preferably offer a fully acceptable identity for whoever may count as insiders to reflect on and be inspired by.’ (184)

This is one way in which Anthropology, according to Hannerz, should organise itself in order to adjust to neoliberalism, to produce yet another brand for the increasingly less thoughtful crowd, and not to challenge brands, short attention spans, or neoliberalism. In conceiving of the possibility of a ‘fully acceptable identity’ for insiders (anthropologists), Hannerz is imagining in terms of a hegemonic ‘one vision’. As he argues: ‘We should try to stabilise and institutionalise our own understanding of it’ (188).
The issue of branding stems from a broader discussion about disciplines and their permanence in the university system. Hannerz has two simultaneous positions here. On the one hand, disciplines have posed an ‘obstacle to vitality and creativity’ and it is possible that the ‘end’ of Anthropology could come about as part of a generalized dissolution of all disciplines, given that with ‘many current issues, tendencies, and phenomena’, discipline boundaries do ‘tend to get blurred’ (179). On the other hand, Hannerz would like the status quo to be preserved: ‘I do not think the best solution is to abolish disciplines, as bodies of knowledge and as intellectual communities’ (179). He does not explain further. Surely as a body of accumulated knowledge, Anthropology would remain (as long as there are libraries), and ‘intellectual communities’ have formed for thousands of years before the modern university system ever came into being, and they still form now outside of the walls of academia.

However, Hannerz is not too concerned with the potential disappearance of disciplines. ‘Disciplines would not seem likely to go away soon’, and he explains why he thinks so:

‘When U.S. universities tend to be overwhelmingly dominant in the global ranking lists of academic excellence, one might keep in mind that these institutions have mostly not seemed inclined to close down discipline departments in favour of alternative modes of organisation.’ (180)

Hannerz seems to make an important observation here: the hegemony of ‘disciplined’ knowledge owes its continued existence to U.S. dominance. Yet, this is where the neoliberal order later seems to cause him concern, contradicting his own position above:

‘The politicians of neoliberal academia would not appear to attach any particular importance to the reproduction of disciplines or to the survival of departments. In these times, I would be worried that arguments for a decline of disciplines and for the superiority of transdisciplinarity can turn into clichés that are made to serve as opportune alibis for politicians and administrators to do away with the autonomy of those clusters of intellectual activity that seem least profitable.’ (183)

Neoliberalism is not a problem for Hannerz, when it comes to branding and to the hegemony of the disciplines; however, neoliberalism does become a problem if arguments for overcoming disciplinary structures show any chance of winning. Note also how he suggests that Anthropology might be least profitable—when he and others in this volume devote paragraphs to boasting that Anthropology has never been bigger than it is now, with record numbers of students, practitioners, professional associations, journals, and new departments. If the narrative is unstable, it is not the only time one encounters this in the volume. Nevertheless, I do share the concern about the targeted elimination of Anthropology simply because it suits neoliberal administrators’ desires for ‘practical applications’ that can ‘partner with industry’. I therefore do not disagree with Hannerz in his (limited) criticisms of neoliberalism, I merely wish he would be more consistent and clear.

What is far more disconcerting and politically problematic, however, is the uncritical manner in which Hannerz boasts of Anthropology’s ‘friends in high places’ and its ‘signs of success’ (195).
Hannerz apparently endorses Francis Fukuyama’s (2004) call for “knowledge about the subtleties and nuances of how foreign societies work, knowledge that would help us better predict the behaviour of political actors, friendly and hostile, in the broader world” (196). If one reads the original article, the argument was framed as part of a U.S. response in its ‘global war on terror’, with Fukuyama himself being one of the original signatories of the ‘neoconservative’ Project for a New American Century (PNAC). Given that Hannerz imports this perspective into a validation of Anthropology, one can reasonably assume that along with ‘studying diversity’ to aid the imperial state, he would have little problem with ‘human terrain mapping’ and with the reproduction of Anthropology as a tool of global surveillance and global counterinsurgency. (Again, how little we have really achieved in decolonising anthropology.) Indeed, without any criticism or question, Hannerz quotes U.S. Senator John McCain (2007): “understanding foreign cultures is not a luxury but a strategic necessity”—which is part of McCain’s call for a yet another spy agency, a ‘new’ version of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), precursor to the CIA, which as Hannerz is quick to remind us, again without criticism, was where Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Gregory Bateson worked (196). While Hannerz ever so politely adds, ‘we may worry about the suggested company’, he notes what this new agency would do, quoting McCain, which would be to gather “specialists in unconventional warfare, civil affairs, and psychological warfare; covert-action operators; and experts in anthropology, advertising, and other relevant disciplines from inside and outside the government” (196). Finally, Hannerz also quotes Obama, almost ending his chapter on this, saying there is a need to understand ‘non-Western cultures’ because, as Obama says, “‘We don’t have good intelligence on them’” (196). This might be a winning argument for Anthropology in some quarters; in others, it indict anthropologists not as ‘handmaidens’ of imperialism, but rather as imperialists proper.

**Conclusion: Threats, Dangers and Saviours**

In the first chapter of the volume, ‘The crisis of anthropology’, Holger Jebens convincingly makes the case that ‘the whole history of the discipline can indeed be described as a history of dangers and threats’ (14), and he shows this by taking us through three historical phases: the 1830s, 1960s, and the 1990s. As Jebens further demonstrates, ‘even before anthropology established itself as an academic discipline, its practitioners were afraid that they would soon lose their object of research’ (15). That is a critically important observation, but by not pausing to focus attention on this point Jebens loses the chance for a significant revision of the history of the discipline. In the period before anthropology became institutionalised Anthropology, especially during the era of scientific racism and social Darwinism, with the dominance of racial and cultural evolutionary theories and typologies, it would be very difficult to plausibly argue that in that period those anthropologists identified with the people whom they studied. So it was not because of identification with threats against Indigenous Peoples that anthropologists mourned their own loss too. The much more sobering realisation therefore has to be that it was with the presumed/promised death of indigeneity that anthropologists instead promoted themselves. Evolutionism, and the policies it validated—whether extinctionist or assimilationist—required a permanent home outside of commercial freak shows and exhibitions at world fairs. While still ‘amateur,’ the American School of Ethnology in the mid-1800s U.S., and in the 1870s the federally-instituted Bureau of American Ethnology, both enshrined evolutionist perspectives (see Haller 1971). The latter was the first actual institution in the U.S. to produce self-described ‘anthropological’ research. Evolutionism produced the need for an
institutionalised, professionalised, disciplined Anthropology—and it eventually found one, in spite of Franz Boas, indeed reviving after Boas. Danger—in this case the death of the indigenous—has been productive of Anthropology.

The question that remains after reading this volume is: why is ‘the end of anthropology’ the title, with the cover featuring an image of the extinct Dodo bird? After all, it is in this same volume that at numerous points we find boasts not just of the continued, tenacious survival of Anthropology, but even its expansion (see for example pages 9, 11, 28, 78, 102, 139, 155, 178, 203). One line of inquiry, that none of the contributors to this volume considered, has to do with other facets and potentialities produced by the incessant ‘crisis talk’. Crisis is akin to emergency, and it can be a way of attracting attention and potential support. With pleas emerging about imminent loss and decline, any increased visibility gained (for example via books about the end of anthropology, or the futures of anthropology) can be useful to gain greater recognition, with the objective of gaining material support to fund what is in fact a growing international bureaucracy surrounding both academic Anthropology and the NGOs that are most closely aligned or entangled with it, such as the aptly named emergency organisations, Cultural Survival Inc. and Survival International. That would be an externally-oriented facet of crisis talk. Then there is the internal function of crisis talk, which is to marshal order among the ranks, to enforce the boundaries of the discipline, and to ensure that certain intellectual agendas are upheld while others never see the light of day. That is why even some of the more dissenting and revolutionary chapters in the volume all contain some outline, some recipe, of how Anthropology ought to be done and what it should mean. Crisis implies a threat of chaos, and there always seem to be those who will step in and either promise to end the first (if they did not first manufacture it themselves) and to prevent the latter. If anything, what seems to be lamented in this volume is not so much continued Euro-American hegemony, but a hegemony that continues without doctrinal cohesion and security—not so much the lack of a brand as the lack of a Vatican, to speak figuratively only. In some regards, the American Anthropological Association may well try to act as our Vatican.

None of this is to suggest that the volume is not a very interesting and clearly a very thought provoking volume that merits a wider discussion than its extremely high price will realistically afford. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the contributors, or something in between, or beyond, the volume does offer some productive points of both entry and departure for further research and analysis. I have tried to suggest a few above with various questions and criticisms. What lingers the most with me, as just one reader, are two key areas for more developed inquiry. One has to do with thinking outside of the mandated confines of disciplined knowledge, arrested by state and private authorities and placed behind academic walls. We may have won some friends in ‘high places’, but high places have a way of falling apart eventually, and those who stood with those at the top are sometimes called to account. Within the question of the professionalisation of the discipline lies a still largely unexplored area of how Anthropology serves as a western, largely white, middle-class mode of ‘consumption’, specifically the consumption of knowledge about the world that has been ‘appropriately’ filtered, organized, and translated. Of course getting a degree in Anthropology is not just like any other form of consumption, just as it is not merely an expression of curiosity: the process results in formal certification.
The second area of continued concern to me has to do with empire. When I said above that evolutionism produced the need for an institutionalised, professionalised, disciplined Anthropology, I was alluding to the strong points made in Adam Kuper’s chapter in this volume as covered here. However, we are neither dealing just with evolutionism, nor just with notions of ‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ peoples. These constructs are part of a larger structure, and that is imperialism itself. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith explained effectively, knowledge and culture were extracted, appropriated, classified, and distributed, in an organised and systematic fashion through institutionalised disciplines, where knowledge and culture were treated much like other commodities (1999, 58–60). As she adds: ‘Imperialism and colonialism are the specific formations through which the West came to “see”, to “name” and to “know” indigenous communities’ (Smith 1999, 60). This is mentioned because the ‘complicity’ of Anthropology with imperialism should never have been reduced to a limited consideration of how anthropologists aided some administrations or participated in war and espionage, or how we may have performed as mere ‘handmaidens’ (which if anything diminishes our role). Instead what should also have been examined critically, and still needs to be done, is the degree to which the actual substance of our ideas and practice of the discipline mirror and further the imperial project of power and domination, not to be too blunt. On that kind of Anthropology, the sun has yet to set.

1 Remember, these contributions do not actually speak to one another, unlike the ‘dialogue’ I am making them perform here.
References


